Activity Theory round up

Kaptelinin et al. (1999) give synoptic definitions of what Activity theory is and how it can be applied. In common with Disruptive Technology and Disruptive Innovation (1997, 2003), Activity theory is not predictive (1999, p. 28).

Kaptelinin et al. assert the dynamic role of tools in activity systems, as tools acquire usage through meaning ,and influence the thought and conduct of users:   ‘… a tool comes fully into being when it is used and… knowing how to use it is a crucial part of the tool. So, the use of tools is an evolutionary accumulation and transmission of social knowledge, which influences the nature of not only external behaviour but also the mental functioning of individuals’ (p.32).

Moreover, as meaning evolves from usage it is relevant to observe usage over time and thus observe the construction of meaning within an activity system; ‘It is important to understand how tools are not used in a single instant of trying them out in a laboratory (for example) but as usage unfolds over time. In that time, development may occur making the tool more useful and efficient than might be seen in a single observation’ (1999, p. 32). 

Whitworth (2005) argues that ‘Conflict within organisations is inevitable, but without conflict there would be no creativity, and hence no innovation’ (p. 690). However, Benson and Whitworth (2007) challenge an understanding of activity systems, namely that all contradictions therein need to be removed. Instead, they argue, ‘… tensions within activity systems are not inherently divisive… “best practice” may entail understanding the tensions within activity systems, rather than believing them to be troublesome variables, better eradicated’ (2007, p.79). Subsequently, Benson et al. (2008) draw attention to nodes within Engestrom’s (1987) representation of the activity system, arguing that ‘Rules, roles and tools are as much the territory of centralised economic and political forces as they are for learning and teaching’ (2008, p.466).  Hence, activity systems are not hermetic, as individual nodes within the activity system are shaped by wider economic, political and social factors.

 

References

Benson, A. D., and Whitworth, A. (2007) ‘Technology at the planning table: Activity theory, negotiation and course management systems,’ Journal of Organisational Transformation and Social Change, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 75-92.

 

Benson, A., Lawler, C. And Whitworth, A. (2008) ‘Rules, roles and tools: Activity theory and the comparative study of e-learning,’ British journal of Educational Technology, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 456-467.

 

Christensen, C. M. (1997) The innovator’s dilemma: when new technologies cause great firms to fail, Boston, Mass., Harvard Business School Press.

 

Christensen, C. M. and Raynor, M. E. (2003) The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.

 

Kaptelinin, V., Nardi, B., and Macaulay, C. (1999) ‘the Activity Checklist: A Tool for Representing the “Space” of Context,’ Interaction, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 27-39.

 

Whitworth, A. (2005) ‘Colloqium’ British Journal of Educational Technology, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 685-691.

Smagorinsky, P. (2001) ‘If meaning is constructed, what is it made from?’

One of the implications of Disruptive Technology/Disruptive Innovation theory is that meaning emerges from usage. Users construct a meaning for a technology, which may differ from the designer’s original intentions.

For Activity Theory, too, the meaning of a tool, its purpose, arises from usage; the subject employs the tool to serve a specific purpose, with the design of a tool having only limited power to determine its epistemic use (Engestrom 2007). Samgorinsky echoes this view when he writes: ‘… the same implement may serve as a different tool for different users, no tool at all for other users, or a different tool for the same user in different situations, depending on how (or if at all) it is conceptualized’ (p. 139). 

Smagorinsky’s article is interested in what influences the construction of meaning, and how the potential uses of tools are conceptualised. The construction of usage and hence meaning is not an unfettered process and, instead, is shaped by pre-existing power structures in a given society. Hence, ‘dominant cultures have the power to define their version of reality as reality, thus establishing their values as authoritative and sovereign’ (p. 136). In practice, in learning and teaching situations, ‘teachers emphasise specific reading conventions and discourage others’ (p.138). Consequently, socio-economic groups socialised within the dominant culture have an educational advantage, as their values and practices have already been constructed, and reaffirmed by dominant culture. Hence, and unsurprisingly, ‘school becomes a much more hospitable and rewarding experience for some groups than for others’ (p. 138).

For Smagorinsky, therefore, meanings constructed are, in turn, shaped by history, economics and politics, all mediated through the culture of texts and other tools. Meanings are shaped by history in the sense that existing possibilities for the use of a tool will have been constructed by previous societies and individuals, thereby comprising a range of established uses. Meanings are shaped by economics and politics in the sense that some social groups will share the dominant culture because it affords them certain privileges and protections, whereas other groups will be disadvantaged by the dominant culture and are thus less likely to share its norms. Smagorinsky writes of readers: ‘Though alone, they engage in culturally mediated processes, in dialogue with the great history of texts… Though alone, they act in relationship with other readers and readings, participating in communities of practice where social positioning and powerful readings have consequences for others… meaning emerges for the worlds they inhabit and the lives they lead within their worlds’ (p.163). Meaning is constructed within, or against, a framework established by a dominant culture which articulates history in order to legitimise its own dominance.

Smagorinsky reminds us that the use of tools does not occur in a creative vacuum; individuals do not approach a tool as an unlimited index of possibilities. Furthermore, Smagorignsky’s understanding of knowledge overlaps with Wenger’s when the latter writes, ‘Our knowing – even of the most unexceptional kind – is always too big, too rich, too ancient, and too connected for us to be the source of it individually’ (1998, p. 141). Hence, when users use tools in innovative, unexpected ways it may be worthwhile trying to understand users’ prior experiences and their position in relation to the dominant culture. It would further be interesting to explore any correlations between dissent (whether explicitly voiced or articulated through practice) and innovation.

References

Engeström, Y. (2007) ‘Enriching the Theory of Expansive Learning: Lessons From Journeys Toward Coconfiguration’, Mind, Culture and Activity, vol. 14, nos. 1-2, pp. 23-39.

Smagorinsky, P. (2001) ‘If meaning is constructed, what is it made from?’: Toward a cultural theory of reading author(s)’, Review of Educational Research, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 133-169.

Wenger, Etienne (1998, repr. 2005), Communities of Practice,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

 

Engestrom et al. (1999) Perspectives on Activity Theory (5)

It is possible to see the internet as causing changes, both in education and in society. From this standpoint, and assuming the internet to be a benign phenomenon in education, the internet democratises learning by, for example, giving learners easy access to resources.

The internet also has the potential to democratise learning when learners have greater technological competence than their lecturers; Scanlon and Issoff’s (2005) research identified an instance in which students helped a lecturer operate a technology, the lecturer welcomed the assistance, and the learning experience was bettered for everyone (what would have happened if the lecturer had asserted his/her authority by resisting the help?). Thus far we have a view of the internet that works within an activity system triangle, as a new tool effects the division of labour.

However, the internet may not be causal. It may, instead, expose existing practices and hierarchies from a new perspective; the idea of the familiar object seen from an unfamiliar angle. For example, and as argued by Castells (2002), the geography of the internet reflects wider power structures: ‘… the use of the internet is highly differentiated in territorial terms, following the uneven distribution of technological infrastructure, wealth, and education in the planet’ (p. 211) and hence, ‘the centrality of the Internet in many areas of social, economic and political activity is tantamount to marginality for those without, or with only limited, access to the Internet, as well as of those unable to use it effectively’ (p. 247). From this standpoint, the internet consolidates and amplifies existing inequalities, and doesn’t cause change.

Tikhomirov (1999) cites data from Zinovieva showing ‘the dependence of intellectual activity’s organization on the level of the subject’s confidence. It appeared that confident subjects had a higher goal orientation, which leads to the “cutting off”… of the hypotheses of all information that does not lead to the goal, as well as higher trust in existing conclusions and higher integration between generalizations’ (p. 350). Hence, some subjects (in the sense of individuals) pursue goals more rigorously than others, and are less likely to be distracted by changes within and between other nodes in the activity system. However, this is about subjects, not about tools and thus Activity Theory might now suggest that, in the case of the internet, the tool is not effecting large-scale changes because the subject and their disposition towards the goal is the primary determinant. However, privileging the subject node makes the activity system three-dimensional, in the sense that it has peaks of influence.

Tikhomirov goes on to make large claims for the internet:  ‘New forms of creative work, education, and play appear, forms that are simply impossible without computers. At the same time, new types of stereotyped, routine activity appear… The computer is not only a universal data-processing device, it is also a universal means of influencing human activity and, consequently, the human psyche… The specific character of such influence is defined, first of all, not by a computer, but by the organizational and social conditions of its use and by the characteristics of the activity’ (p. 353). Having said the internet does effect change, Tikhomoirov also argues that the potential of the internet to effect change is shaped by other nodes in the activity system. Hence there has to be a broader constellation, without which the potential of the internet to cause change is not realised. However, if the right conditions are created than, Tikhomirov argues, change ensues in patterns of human activity and thus, from a materialist perspective, in the human psyche.

It is difficult to argue convincingly that the internet is causing changes to the human psyche, because of immanence; it is not possible to stand outside evolving processes in which individuals are implicated. It is possible to argue that the internet is changing the way we learn, as it blurs the lines between learning, working and socialising (Conole et al., 2008). It is less easy to argue that the internet democtaises learning, because of both a first level digital divide (with sections of the population not having net access), and a second level digital divide (Hirgattai 2002), whereby people lack effective access by not having the skills required to make effective use of the internet.

Tikhomirov, from a materialist perspective, argues that a change in practice leads to changes in perception, and in consciousness. This imbues the activity system with particular significance, as changing patterns of behaviour, which can result from just one change in one node, lead to different patterns of thinking in individuals and collectives. Therefore, if the internet is changing what we do, it may also change what we think.

References

Castells, M. (2002) The Internet Galaxy,Oxford,OxfordUniversity Press.

Conole, G., Laat, Maarten de, Dillon, T. and Darby, J. (2008) ‘“Disruptive technolgies”, “pedagogical innovation”: What’s new? Findings from an in-depth study of students’ use and perception of technology’ Computers and Education, vol. 50, pp. 511-524.

Hargittai, E. (2002) ‘Second Level Digital Divide: Differences in People’s Onlnie Skills’ First Monday,  http://www.eszter.com/research/pubs/hargittai-secondleveldd.pdf (accessed 12 August 2011).

Scanlon, E. and Issoff, K. (2005) ‘Activity Theory and Higher Education: evaluating learning technologies’ Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, vol. 21, pp. 430-439.

Tikhomirov, O. K. (1999) ‘The theory of activity changed by information technology’ in Y. Engestrom, R. Miettinen and R.-L. Punamaki (eds.) Perspectives on Activity Theory,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversity Press, pp. 325-346.

Engestrom et al. (1999) Perspectives on Activity Theory (4)

Engestrom (1999) provides a close analysis of activity theory, activity systems and expansive learning, the latter occurring when tensions in an activity system are exposed. The exposure of tensions within an activity system can lead to the system’s reconfiguration, via expansive learning. 

Engestrom touches on the Marxist roots of activity theory, by affirming it ‘is based on a dialectical theory of knowledge and thinking’ (p. 378). The tensions within an existing system are the breeding ground for new forms of knowledge.

Engestrom is particularly interested in the object node in an activity system, and in the determining effects of the object node. Activity theory argues that purposeful human activities are mediated through tools (material or symbolic), but Engestrom also argues, ‘Activities are social practices oriented at objects’ (p. 380). Hence, ‘the object gains motivating force that gives shape and direction to activity. The object determines the horizon of possible actions’ (p381). The object of the activity system, therefore, shapes the parameters of the activity, as the activity is configured to attain the object (though an object and an eventual outcome need not be one and the same).

Engestrom’s analysis becomes more complex when he distinguishes objects from goals: ‘Objects are not to be confused with goals. Goals are attached to specific actions. Actions have clear points of beginning and termination and relatively short half-lives. Activity systems evolve through long historical cycles in which clear beginnings and ends are difficult to determine’ (p. 381). The essential difference appears to be one of scale; specific actions can be directed towards goals, but activity systems are more longitudinal, in the sense that, being dialectical, they exacerbate and expose tensions over time.

Building on his understanding of the importance of objects in activity systems, and on the distinction between objects and the more localised, immediate and thus more easily identifiable goals, Engestrom writes, ‘being a horizon, the object is never fully reached or conquered’ (p. 381). It appears to me that activity systems are more likely to get reconfigured under the pressure of their own internal contradictions than they are to get fully and unproblematically realised, other than in the short term context of a specific action leading to a goal. Tension between nodes appears to be the natural state of activity systems over time. 

Given the focus on change over time, and the distinction between objects and goals, Engestrom draws a further distinction, between innovative learning and an expansive cycle. The former can be localised, but the latter needs a more substantial temporal frame in which to play through: ‘Miniature cycles of innovative learning should be regarded as potentially expansive. A large-scale, expansive cycle of organizational transformation always consists of small cycles of innovative learning. However, the appearance of small-scale cycles of innovative learning does not in itself guarantee that an expansive cycle is going on’ (p. 385). Hence, the localised event of innovative learning can signify the emergence of expansive learning, but need not necessarily do so. However, one form of innovative learning prompting another and another comprises the ground work and the catalyst for expansive learning.

Engestrom also constructs a similar distinction between a solution innovation and a trajectory innovation: ‘A solution innovation typically applies only to the specific case for which it was invented, whereas a trajectory innovation is aimed at becoming a more or less permanent, repeatedly used procedure. Of course, it is possible that a solution innovation is subsequently repeated consciously in similar new situations, thus becoming a trajectory innovation. Conversely, a trajectory innovation may fail to generalize beyond the first application, thus effectively becoming a one-time solution innovation’ (p. 387).  Again, the essence of the distinction is between a localised event, and a bigger, structural change. However, the solution innovation can comprise a template that can be applied to solve other problems, hence establishing itself as a trajectory innovation, without having been conceived as one in the first place.

Engetsrom’s article as a whole brings additional complexity to activity theory, activity systems and expansive learning. The article argues that changes in activity systems and the emergence of expansive learning are only observable over time (typically, 2 to 3 years in research studies). However, individual innovations can develop into expansive transformations. Individual innovations, therefore, are unlikely to arise on the basis of an analysis of an activity system, and are more likely to be constructed in the face of an immediate, not recognisably structural, problem. However, localised solutions can accumulate, thus creating the conditions in which existing, structural problems are more manifest, leading to a collective desire to overhaul the existing structure, and replace it with an activity system better suited to its current context.

Reference

Engestrom, Y. (1999) ‘Innovative learning in work teams: Analyzing cycles of knowledge creation in practice,’ in Y. Engestrom, R. Miettinen and R.-L. Punamaki (eds.) Perspectives on Activity Theory,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversity Press, pp. 377-404.

 

 

 

 

Engestrom et al. (1999) Perspectives on Activity Theory (2)

Further notes on Engestrom, Y., Miettinen, R.  and Punamaki, R. L. eds. (1999) Perspectives on Activity Theory,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversity Press.

Brostrom (1999) writes, ‘In play activity children very often go beyond the current contextual frame. Children not only appropriate the social surrounding world, they also make unexpected creative changes. Observations of play in preschools indicate that children not only adopt [sic] to and internalize the local institutional culture but expand beyond it as well. Through this activity new knowledge, skills, and actions often appear’ (p. 251). It would be interesting to substitute ‘people’ for ‘children’ in this passage, as creativity can emerge from seemingly aimless activity undertaken by children or adults. New knowledge and understanding can occur serendipitously, or when boundaries are weakened or removed. Therefore, while Activity Theory relates to activity that is purposeful, the process and development of play suggests that Expansive Learning (Engestrom 1987, 2001) can happen, and may happen more easily, without goal-directed action. As Hakkarainen (1999) notes, ‘There is no necessity to produce any concrete results or attain previously formulated goals in play’ (p. 234). The products of play, because they are not pre-figured, can be new, and revelatory,

Brostrom also writes, ‘If the teachers make room for children’s creative activities, they themselves will generate such expanding elements. The opposite will occur if the teachers put too much structure into the play. Expansive play will not appear’ (p. 261). Again, we can apply this to learning generally, rather than to the learning of children in particular. Expansive Learning requires an appropriate environment in which to flourish. The more learning is controlled, the fewer the outlets for creativity, though it is unlikely that it could ever be suppressed entirely.

Lompscher (1999) follows Brostrom’s analysis by summarising conventional learning: ‘in most classrooms students are objects of didactic actions aimed at the transmission of knowledge and skills (and norms and values, as well) from the teacher’s head (or from the textbook) to the pupils’ heads’ (p. 266). Conventional learning, therefore, obstructs creativity. By giving learners (and workers) more creative opportunities, educational institutions and workplaces create more opportunities for the creation of new knowledge and understanding. The implications for this approach, as far as Activity Theory is concerned, is that it challenges the role of the ‘Object’ node, and may encourage a new configuration of the structure.

References

Brostrom, S. (1999) ‘Drama games with 6-year-old children: Possibilities and limitations,’ in Y. Engestrom, R. Miettinen and R.-L. Punamaki (eds.) Perspectives on Activity Theory,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversity Press.

Engeström, Y. (1987) Learning by expanding: an activity-theoretical approach to developmental research.Helsinki, Orienta-Konsultit Oy. http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/toc.htm (accessed 8 July 2011).

Engestrom, Y. (2001) ‘Expansive Learning at Work: toward an activity theoretical reconceptualization,’ Journal of Education and Work, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 133-156.

Hakkarainen, P. (1999) ‘Play and motivation,’ in Y. Engestrom, R. Miettinen and R.-L. Punamaki (eds.) Perspectives on Activity Theory,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversity Press.

Lompscher, J. (1999) ‘Activity formation as an alternative strategy of instruction’ ’ in Y. Engestrom, R. Miettinen and R.-L. Punamaki (eds.) Perspectives on Activity Theory,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversity Press.