Litowitz (1997) ‘Just say no: Responsibility and resistance’

Litowitz summarises Vygotsky’s argument that development takes place on two planes; interpsychically (between two people) and intrapsychically (between one person). What was external becomes internal; ‘other-regulation becomes self-regulation’ (p.473).Instruction is absorbed, and the learner is able to produce the desired behaviour without supervision.

 

Litowitz suggests that our conduct as learners and teachers may be shaped by impulse. We have, Litowitz argues, both a pedagogical impulse, and an impulse ‘to master problems and perform tasks in just the ways more knowledgeable others do’ (p. 474). Litowitz develops her argument in a way that relates to the Community of Practice theory (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998), because she relates the impulse to the pursuit of an identity rather than to the pursuit of the thing being learnt: ‘What motivates the children to master tasks is not the mastery itself but the desire to be the adult and/or be the one whom the adult wants her or him to be’ (p.475).

 

Litowitz also critiques Vygotasky’s Zone of Proximal Development, arguing it ‘is an adultocentric view of the child’s behavior’ (p.477). Her argument is that Vygotsky’s concept is weighted towards the teacher rather than the learner; the Zone of Proximal Development, Litowitz argues, views knowledge as something imparted rather than co-constructed. Based on her reading of the learning and teaching impulse, involving the development of an identity rather than the acquisition of a product called knowledge, she recommends, ‘redefinition of the task to include the learner’s perspective should not only include a re-examination of what we are asking the learner to do but whom we are asking the learner to be’ (p.479).

 

Litowitz argues, ‘The desire to move beyond participation to responsibility is in itself as act of resistance, a resistance to being dependent and controlled by another’ (p.482). Hence, learner autonomy is axiomatically threatening to existing activity systems (Vygotsky, 1927; Engestrom, 1987) because the learner (the subject) is repositioning themselves, which has implications for the tools they will use, the objects (purposes) they will pursue, and the social relations inhering in a learning and teaching situation.

 

References

Engestrom, Y. (1987). Learning by expanding: An activity-theoretical approach to developmental research. Helsinki: Orienta-Konsultit Oy. http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/toc.htm (accessed 5 April 2013).

Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Litowitz, B.E. (1997) ‘Just say no: Responsibility and resistance,’ in Cole, M.,  Engestrom, Y. and Vasquez, O., eds., Mind, Culture, and Activity: Seminal papers from the laboratory of comparative human cognition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 473-484.

Vygotsky, L. (1927). The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky, vol. 3: problems of the theory and history of Psychology. In: Rieber, R. and Wollock, J. eds. (1997). The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky, vol. 3: problems of the theory and history of Psychology, New York, Plenum.

Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice: Learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Vygotsky, L (1930) ‘The socialist alteration of man’

Vygotsky challenges the dualism between the individual and the social: ‘an individual only exists as a social being, as a member of some social group within whose context he follows the road of his historical development’ (p.175). Instead of seeing the individual as unique and inviolable, Vygotsky argues that identity is constructed ultimately by economic forces of production, and resultant social relations: ‘Already in primitive societies, which are just taking their first steps along the road of their historical development, the entire psychological  makeup of individuals can be seen to depend directly on the development of technology, the degree of development of the production forces and on the structure of that social group to which the individual belongs’ (p.176).

 

If Vygotsky is correct, then consciousness, thoughts, and the articulation of thoughts are determined by the material and historical conditions within which any individual resides: ‘We have to proceed from the basic assumption that intellectual production is determined by the form of material production’ (p.177).

 

A problem with the Capitalist mode of production, for Vygotsky, is that, ‘As a result of the advance of capitalism, the development of material production simultaneously brought with it the progressive division of labour and the constantly growing distorted development of the human potential’ (p.178). The capitalist mode of production alienates the worker from what s/he produces, by reducing the individual worker’s role to one action in a broader process of automation. The division of labour as a material condition of production has a corrosive effect on intellectual production and consciousness. Conversely, the individual craftsperson produces their good from raw material to completion.

 

Vygotsky believes in the transformative potential of education: ‘It is education which should play the central role in the transformation of man – this road of conscious formation of new generations, the basic form to alter the historical human type’ (p.181). Through education, individuals and groups can question their existing practices, perceive the economic conditions underlying their practices, and postulate new ones. Vygotsky further states, after Engels, ‘it is labour which created man’ (p.183). Actions create consciousness, and thus contain the potential to change consciousness.

 

 

Reference

Vygotsky, L. [1930] ‘The socialist alteration of man,’ in Van Der Veer, R., and Valsiner, J, Eds. (1998) The Vygotsky Reader, Oxford, Blackwell, 175-184.

 

Final note on Engestrom (1987, ch.2, ‘The emergence of learning activity…’

Engestrom’s analysis of artistic production is that an emotion is experienced individually, but the articulation of the emotion as a work of art comprises a social artefact, as it is now externalised beyond the individual.

Engestrom breaks down the demarcation between artistic and scientific production: ‘The learning actions inherent in scientific and artistic activity are those of learning to imagine, learning to “go beyond the given”, not in the privacy of the individual mind but in public, material objectifications.’ Hence, both scientists and artists seek to articulate that which is not yet known, and both adopt an experimental approach to achieve their articulation.

From Engestrom’s position of Activity Theory, the spur to artistic production comes from a contradiction between existing nodes within the system. Artistic production, arising from learning and experimentation, comprises ‘societally new activity structures… out of actions manifesting the inner contradictions of the preceding form of the activity in question.’

For Engestrom, therefore (and, incidentally, for both Vygotsky and Huizinga, previously) learning is closely allied to play, because play often involves experimentation without a formal and pre-determined outcome. Play in this sense is not structured recreation, but the more fundamentally human practice of activity without a utilitarian purpose.

Rodriguez (2006) argues that play is more important intrinsically than extrinsically. People play for ‘the experience that it affords. We do not characteristically play to fulfill a practical task…’ Rodriguez further argues that ‘Playful, exploratory learning… is not about the enhancement of learning and teaching, but about ‘a profound rethinking of its [teaching’s] methods and subject matter.’ What this means for technology-enhanced learning is that learners can be given the technology and simply see where it takes them. If the outcome is not utilitarian then the learning has not failed, because playing with technologies can be intrinsically fulfilling for the learner. The idea of learning comprising self-direction is placed in a more orthodox educational context by Krejsler (2004, p. 501): ‘May we to a larger extent orchestrate the classroom as some sort of agora [play space]… By understanding spaces of learning like that, we would implicitly encourage the student to experiment in ways whereby he/she may eventually acquire for himself/herself more mature autonomy.’ The position is utopian, yet it is also the next step on from Engestrom’s expansive learning (2001), with the removal not only of an authoritative centre, but of an object, too.

Engeström, Y. (1987) Learning by expanding: an activity-theoretical approach to developmental research. Helsinki, Orienta-Konsultit Oy. http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/toc.htm (accessed 10 February 2013).

Engestrom, Y. (2001) “Expansive Learning at Work: toward an activity theoretical reconceptualization”, Journal of Education and Work, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 133-156.
Huizinga, J. (1971) Homo Ludens, Boston, Beacon Press.

Krejsler, J. (2004) Becoming individual in education and cyberspace, Teachers and Teaching: theory and practice, 10 (5), 489-503.

Rodriguez, H. (2006) The Playful and the Serious: An approximation to Huizinga’s Homo Ludens Game Studies: The International Journal of Computer Game Research, 6 (1), http://gamestudies.org/0601/articles/rodriges (accessed 10 February 2013).

Vygotsky, L., (1994) ‘Imagination and creativity of the adolescent,’ in, Van Der Veer, R. And Valsiner, J., eds. The Vygotsky Reader, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 266-288.

More notes on Engestrom (1987) ch. 2, ‘The emergence of learning activity…’

Learning

 

Engestrom explores the relationship between formal education and learning. He argues that the institutionalisation of knowledge makes it a self-conscious, abstract process: ‘The emergence of the first distinct, specialized forms of transmission of knowledge and experience brings about the first conscious learning actions.’

Engestrom further argues that learning per se is unintentional and inevitable, but that the emergence of structured formal learning is linked to literacy: ‘reading and writing are such abstract or indirect instruments that they cannot be learned by simply participating in work activity.’ Moreover, learning and knowledge have their own history: ‘In the European Middle Ages, knowledge is understanding texts. Getting to know reality means to learn what authorities wrote about it. The recitation of texts is the most important means of communication of scientific knowledge.’ Learning in this institutional context is passive.

 

Engestrom, citing the work of Lave (1985), identifies a mismatch between formal and ‘real world’ learning: ‘There appear to be discontinuities between problem-solving in the supermarket and arithmetic problem-solving in school. School problems seem designed primarily to elicit the learning and display of procedures, using set inputs. School lessons are fraught with difficulty and failure for many students. On the other hand, extraordinarily successful arithmetic activity takes place in situations outside school.’ Hence, school is a form of learning, but does not have a monopoly on learning.

Formal education systems have winners and losers. Formal learning also has individuals who do not conform to the system: ‘The history of the school is also a history of inventing tricks for beating the system, and of protesting and breaking out. But although these actions are age-old, they have not expanded into a new type of activity – into learning activity… [T]oday’s pupils are at an early age intensively drawn into the market as relatively independent consumers, even as producers of exchange values (as computer hackers, as sport stars and performers, etc.). When the pupils’ direct participation in the societal production is intensified, the “holding power” of the school is endangered.  In this respect, school-going may well be approaching a crisis of new qualitative dimensions. Whether this will mean a breakthrough into learning activity in school – that remains to be seen.’ Hence, deviant behaviour, within an Activity Theory framework, can signify the possibility of (or a need for) a new system for the production and distribution of knowledge.

 

Engestrom identifies learning as something humans do. He further identifies a misalignment, for some learners, between formal learning and ‘real world’ learning and experience. Engestrom also argues, historically, that formal learning arises out of literacy.

 

Engeström, Y. (1987). Learning by expanding: an activity-theoretical approach to developmental research, Helsinki, Orienta-Konsultit Oy. http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/toc.htm (accessed 18 January 2013).

Lave, J. (1985) ‘Introduction: Situationally specific practice,’ Anthropology and Education Quarterly, 16, pp. 171-176.

Moore (2004) ‘Darwin and the Demon’

Moore’s article defines different kinds of disruption.

 

Moore gives his own definition of disruptive innovation: ‘markets appear as if from nowhere, creating massive new sources of wealth. It tends to have its roots in technological discontinuities, such as the one that enabled Motorola’s rise to prominence with the first generation of cell phones, or in fast-spreading fads like the collector game Pokémon’ (p. 88). Moore’s argument aligns with Christensen’s original formulation of disruptive technology (1997), but his mention of fads hones in usefully on the idea that not all disruptions are sustainable, nor is disruption good axiomatically. Disruption is a form of practice, and how it develops depends on how communities create a purpose for it. However, this is not an organic process, as external factors, such as marketing, can shape a community’s response to a technology.

 

Moore comes up with another category, Application Innovation, and supplies the example of how ‘Tandem applied its fault-tolerant computers to the banking market to create ATMs’ (p.88). This is very close to Christensen and Raynor’s Disruptive Innovation (2003), which sees disruption arising from practice rather than design. Moore’s use of Application Innovation suggests that innovation can be a conscious process (at the application if not the design stage), whereas Christensen and Raynor see innovation as more serendipitous, arising out of practice; this is also the case in Christensen’s account of Honda motorcycles in the USA (1997).

 

In addition, Moore writes of Structural Innovation, which ‘Capitalizes on disruption to restructure industry relationships. Innovators like Fidelity and Citigroup, for example, have used the deregulation of financial services to offer broader arrays of products and services to consumers under one umbrella. Nearly overnight, those companies became sophisticated competitors to old guard banks and insurance companies’ (p. 88). Here, businesses exploit a new legislative climate to create innovation, which is thus a prompted process, arising from structural (political and economic) change.

 

Where Moore again aligns with Christensen is in seeing established organisations as vulnerable to disruption, because of ‘the inertia that success creates. The deeper the enterprise is into the life cycle and the more successful it has been, the greater its tendency to return to its former course’ (p. 91). Success ossifies, and an organisation will repeat a pattern that has been successful, despite the possibility that the external conditions may have changed, either legislatively, or through the emergence of a new technological innovation.

 

Applying Moore’s analysis to higher education, the sector has been largely resistant to innovation on an institutional level, perhaps because the purpose of the university has not changed fundamentally. A significant number of students attend to gain a qualification by the most arterial route, and will engage with the systems that will help get them there. The increasing cost of higher education, and the lack of a guaranteed graduate job at the end of it, may change students’ expectations of a university (i.e., what they expect a university to do), which could be the catalytic moment, at which point innovation could erupt, at the risk of faddishness. Preparedness for a new role for the university as an institution may be what is required.

 

Moore, Geoffrey A. (2004) ‘Darwin and the Demon,’ Harvard Business Review, July 2004, pp. 86-92.

Notes on Engestrom (1987) ch. 2, ‘The emergence of learning activity…’

1. Activity

Activity Theory and expansive learning argue that new knowledge can be constructed from an existing contradiction within an activity system, a position which, as Engestrom notes, poses the question of, ‘how can a structure generate another structure more complex than itself?’

 

One way to approach the question is to recognise that systems, including education systems, are never wholly stable but, instead, are relevant (and hence useful) within specific, limited historical contexts and, as those contexts evolve and contradictions within them become manifest, the possibility for change, and hence a new activity system, emerges.

 

For Engestrom, the core phenomenon is activity itself. Human practice lies behind the most complex of systems. Meanings are constructed, and ‘The construction of meaning is the specifically human type of activity.’

 

A further feature of Engestrom’s thinking is that activity is not only primary, but also collective. Activities can be undertaken by individuals, but the individual is always implicated in a range of historical and social discourses: ‘Human labor [sic], the mother form of all human activity, is co-operative from the very beginning.’

 

Engestrom is influenced by Vygotsky, in the sense that he argues human activity is mediated through tools, physical (eg, a hammer to put a nail into a wall) or symbolic (eg, an acronym to remember a series of facts for a test). Engestrom is also influenced by Leont’ev in recognising the importance of the object (in the sense of ‘purpose’): ‘According to Leont’ev, … the concept of activity is necessarily connected with the concept of motive.’ Hence, the focus of interest is purposeful human activity.

 

Engestrom argues there are ‘three dominant aspects of human activity – production, distribution and exchange (or communication).’ Moreover, while there may be three aspects of activity, ‘the essential task is always to grasp the systemic whole, not just separate connections.’ In this sense, Engestrom is indebted to Marx: production creates, distribution divides the products, and exchange further divides, based on human need and desire. Thereafter, consumption becomes a direct object/purpose in response to the human want or need. Thus production is the departure, and consumption the conclusion.

 

However, argues Engestrom, ‘Marx goes on to show that things are not so simple as this. Production is always also consumption of the individual’s abilities and of the means of production,’ and hence ‘all form the members of a totality, distinctions within a unity.’

 

    2. Contradiction

Engestrom is interested in contradiction as the catalyst for change, and identifies the primary contradiction in Capitalism as being between the use value of the thing, and its exchange value. For example, designer goods are exchanged for sums that do not reflect their use value (generic goods are cheaper). Engestrom gives the example of a doctor: ‘For example, instruments of this work activity include a tremendous variety of medicaments and drugs. But they are not just useful preparations – they are above all commodities with prices, manufactured for a market, advertised and sold for profit. Every doctor faces this contradiction in his daily decision making.’

 

An example of a secondary contradiction in Capitalism is between technologies (tools) that can ease the burden of labour, and a division of labour that lags behind technological capability.

 

A tertiary contradiction, according to Engestrom, ‘appears when representatives of culture (e.g., teachers) introduce the object and motive of a culturally more advanced form of the central activity into the dominant form of the central activity. For example, the primary school pupil goes to school in order to play with his mates (the dominant motive), but the parents and the teacher try to make him study seriously (the culturally more advanced motive).’ The contradiction is present when a primary purpose has a secondary, more complex purpose superimposed on it.

 

Engestrom argues, ‘… qualitative stages and forms of activity emerge as solutions to the contradictions of the preceding stage of form. This in turn takes place in the form of “invisible breakthroughs.”’ In terms of how breakthroughs, or innovations, happen, ‘In reality it always happens that a phenomenon which later becomes universal originally emerges as an individual, particular, specific phenomenon, as an exception from the rule. It cannot actually emerge in any other way.’ Hence the innovation appears irregular at first, but becomes, over time, mainstream, as its suitability and usefulness to its context is recognised.

 

Engeström, Y. (1987). Learning by expanding: an activity-theoretical approach to developmental research, Helsinki, Orienta-Konsultit Oy. http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/toc.htm (accessed 18 December 2012).

Timmis (2012) ‘Constant companions…’

Timmis argues, ‘the ways in which students themselves use and adapt to  technological tools will  be  an  important aspect of developing sustainable studying and support structures for students’ (p.3).

 

The paper suggests students value peer support; Timmis cites NUS research (2008) arguing students regard a peer network as a highly valuable learning resource. However, and as Timmis notes, ‘research involving students in peer support for learning has mainly concentrated on student involvement in formal mechanisms, such as peer assessment, tutoring or mentoring… Peer support is viewed as a designed intervention on the part of the tutor or university team’ (p.4). A problem with existing research, therefore, is that it overlooks informal peer support among students.

 

It is clear that students have a wealth of digital technologies available to them, but less clear whether this is an asset or a burden: ‘Undergraduates have  to manage a plethora of different digital communication tools and spaces. These include university owned spaces such as  virtual learning  environments (VLEs), university email systems and their own personal communications and social media… This  implies continual multitasking across formal and informal settings and boundaries’ (p.4). An alternative to multitasking is demarcation, and it is possible that students are using specific technology tools for specific purposes, thereby managing and sustaining different digital identities, but not necessarily a plethora of digital technologies.

 

A number of interviewees for the research employ a demarcation between technologies for study, and technologies for social life. For example, ‘I use Facebook  (pause) but  not, not  really  to (pause), not  for any  university-based communication, just almost with  friends and  just post  photos and  such  like and  find out  what’s going on’ (p.9). Hence, and as Timmis argues, ‘students wanted  to  maintain the boundaries between their personal and study-related communications’ (pp. 9-10). The research challenges (albeit implicitly) the idea that students use a wide range of technologies to support their learning.

 

The paper as a whole shows that students use digital technologies for formal and informal peer support. However, the research also suggest that there is a tendency to demarcate in the use of technologies, with different technologies being used to sustain and support different aspects of life. Hence, the conception of students as fervent multitaskers is flawed, or at least debatable; a plethora of technologies is available, but students may well value ease of use and convenience (see, Christensen and Raynor, 2003) above plenitude. 

 

 

 

References

Christensen, C. M. and Raynor, M. E. (2003) The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.

 

Timmis, S. (2012) ‘Constant companions: Instant messaging conversations as sustainable supportive study structures amongst undergraduate peers’ Computers and Education, 59 3-18

Post on another blog

I’ve written a summary post about my research for the King’s Learning Institute technology-enhanced learning blog. It can be accessed at this url:

http://hern.org.uk/blog/

Wolff (2007) ‘Emotion at work…’

Roth argues that emotion should be ‘included in the integral analysis of human activities…’ (p. 40), and also argues that emotion is a neglected area in Activity Theory, which identifies the Subject as a node, but does not always dig down into the complexity of subjectivity.

 

Subjectivity is complicated. Within Activity Theory, and materialist approaches more broadly, subjectivity does not comprise an inviolable essence of self. Instead, subjectivity is  a result ‘of collective life and having a material body, which allows the dawning subject, mediated by its embodied and bodily nature, to be conscious of itself as but one among a plurality of subjects’ (p.44). Therefore, subjectivity is determined by history, and by social forces.

 

Emotion clearly plays a part in learning: ‘Being good at something feeds back… thereby producing and reproducing emotion, enjoyment and motivation’ (p.43). Moreover, emotions play a significant part in our professional lives, owing to ‘the pervasive nature of emotions at work’ (p.57).

 

More controversially, Wolff argues that emotions are learned behaviour: ‘We fear the boss, go crazy over our favourite who is winning the game, or enjoy the company of others, but we know these emotions only because we have learned about them in interactions with other members of the culture’ (p. 46). Emotions are often experienced as an imperative and unmediated, but Wolff argues that emotions are learned through interactions with others. Therefore, emotions are historically and socially determined, too.

 

It would seem, therefore, that character, individuality, is action, and we are what we do. This contradicts the idea of an essence of self determining our actions. Hence, ‘we do not know who a person is independent of the actions of that person’ and ‘attributions about who someone is are based on observable behaviour (actions)’ (p. 56). Subjectivity is the product of historical and social forces, emotions are learned behaviour, and the subject (in Activity Theory) is in a dialectical relationship with other nodes, as the subject is in a state of flux, and hence its relationship with its wider contexts is unstable and unpredictable.

 

Reference

 

Mehan (1997) Students’ interactional competence in the classroom

A short chapter by Mehan (1997) gives insight into the hidden curriculum. While his chapter takes school learning as its object of research, his argument is relevant to study at more advanced levels, and to workplace learning.

 

Mehan is interested in ‘the social organization of classroom instruction’ (p. 235). He argues that success in classrooms depends upon appropriate enculturation as much as it depends on formal, cognitive skills: ‘… the academic dimensions of classroom instruction are embedded in an interactional nexus. To be competent members of the classroom commuity, students must not only master academic subject matter; they must also learn the normative demands of classrooms’ (p. 237). Alongisde the formal instruction that takes place in classrooms, therefore, students also learn behavioural norms, inculcated through context: ‘… students must infer the appropriate way to engage in classroom interaction from contextually provided information. To be competent members of the classroom community, students must be able to interpret implicit classroom rules and provide the proper action on the right occasion’ (p. 237).

 

The classification of students, therefore, may focus on the students who have successfully absorbed the classroom norms, rather than focus on subject competence: ‘those students whom the teacher independently rates as “good students” are those who are able to keep their appropriate behaviour in the eyes of the teacher, and their inappropriate behaviour out of sight. The students who are not rated as “good students” have not made that distinction’ (p. 239).

 

Mehan also argues that the behaviour of participants in a classroom is not a one-way process; it is not simply the case that the presence and conduct of teachers shapes students’ responses. Instead, there is a two-way process: ‘During the course of classroom activities, teachers and students mutually influence one another, and thereby jointly contribute to the social organization of the classroom. Indeed, students are structured and modified by adults in the classroom. But equally importantly, students modify the behavior of adults just as much as they are socially structured and modified by them…’ (p. 239).

 

Mehan’s argument suggests that successful classroom learning is as much about the development of a successfully functioning classroom identity as it is about the acquisition of subject knowledge. In this sense Mehan’s argument aligns with the Community of Practice learning theory (Lave and Wenger, 1991).  

 

Lave, J. And Wenger, E. (1991) Situated learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation, Cambridge, Cambridge University press.

 

Mehan, H. (1997) ‘Students’ interactional competence in the classroom,’ in Cole, M., Engestrom, Y. and Vasquez, O., eds. (1997) Mind, Culture and Activity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 235-41.