Engestrom (1987), ‘Learning by expanding…’ (2)

Notes on ‘3. The zone of proximal development as the basic category of expansive research,’ ‘4. The instruments of expansion’ and ‘5. Towards an expansive methodology.’

Engestrom argues that human activity does not occur in a vacuum. Instead, it always occurs within a social context: ‘Human activity is not only individual production. It is simultaneously and inseparably also social exchange and societal distribution. In other words, human activity always takes place within a community governed by a certain division of labor and by certain rules.’

Furthermore, Engestrom argues that meaning is not constrained by design. Instead, meaning is forged out of usage: ‘A tool always implies more possible uses than the original operations that have given birth to it.’ Similarly, ‘The instructor’s task and the learner’s perceived task are seldom the same thing.’ In this specific sense there is a close connection between Engestrom’s standpoint and Wenger’s analysis of how communities of practice work (1998, p. 80): ‘Even when a community of practice arises in response to some outside mandate, the practice evolves into the community’s own response to that mandate.’ Thus, meaning is not a given (though it may be prompted), but a construct.

In addition, Engestrom challenges the scaffolding metaphor which has, in recent years, become a favourite descriptive tool for social constructivists in learning and teaching. Engestrom’s problem with the metaphor is that it still imposes limits on the knowledge that the learner can construct and, ultimately, ‘the idea of scaffolding is restricted to the acquisition of the given.’

Engestrom’s description of the activity system, the tensions therein and hence the creation of new knowledge and understanding, implies that human activity both works within and challenges tradition. Considering creativity, he argues ‘a work of art (or science)… requires simultaneously acceptance of a convention… and passing beyond it’ and, ‘scientific discoveries… are to a large extent achievements of synthesizing and crystallizing elements that were already “there.”’ A similar argument for the creative process is made by T.S. Eliot in The Sacred Wood (1922), in which Eliot accepts that the artist is always working within an inherited tradition, which is there to be used in order to enable new creation, an argument which takes Eliot to the position of ‘immature poets imitate; mature poets steal.’ Both writers, therefore, see creation not as a spontaneous process (generating that which had not been conceived of before) but as a significant reconfiguration of existing, though not static, economic, social and cultural resources.

In seeking to understand how an activity system changes, and having recognised that tension between nodes in the activity system precipitates change, Engestrom uses the metaphor of the springboard: ‘the springboard is a facilitative image, technique or socio-conversational constellation (or a combination of these) misplaced or transplanted from some previous context into a new, expansively transitional activity context during an acute conflict…’ Tension between nodes, therefore, is a precondition for creativity, and springboards offer a route out of tension towards a new activity system, but they do not in themselves comprise the solution to tensions: ‘Springboards do not come about smoothly and automatically. They appear in times of distress, almost as lifebuoys… Springboards are not solutions. They are starters or hints toward a path leading to an expansive solution.’

Engestrom’s analysis is broadly Marxist in the sense that he sees tension as the spur to progress. Furthermore, he uses the Marxist term ‘dialectics,’ though with his own definition: ‘In my analysis, dialectics is the logic of expansion. And expansion is essentially a social and practical process, having to do with collectives of people reconstructing their material practice.’ However, Engestrom argues that existing structures of learning and teaching militate against the collective construction of new knowledge and understanding: ‘Industrial capitalism is the triumph of individualism. Here, the mature form of learning is obligatory school-going. In the obligatory school, the dominant unit of functioning is the individual, spatially and temporally discrete task.’ Therefore, formal education exists to hinder creativity, not to encourage it.

Engestrom’s distinction between the individual and the social may be problematic in the sense that the activity system presupposes that individuals inhabit, inescapably, social contexts. Furthermore, the activity system within which people function, and which they may go on to transform, is a tradition, an inherited set of values and practices. Therefore, the distinction between the individual and the social may be a false one. As Wenger (1998, p. 141) argues: ‘Our knowing – even of the most unexceptional kind – is always too big, too rich, too ancient, and too connected for us to be the source of it individually.’

In his conclusion, Engestrom returns to Vygotsky and the idea that, in human behaviour, a stimulus and a response have ‘a human-created symbolic stimulus mediating between the two.’ Furthermore, Vygotsky’s object of analysis was ‘observations of behaviour in daily life,’ and, more broadly, ‘the historical transformation of cultures.’ Engestrom follows Vygotsky’s lead, but is also interested in where tension is experienced, arguing ‘individually manifested doubt, hesitation and disturbance is the starting point. The direction is from the individual to the societal. However, the individual point of departure is itself understandable only as a cultural-historical product.’ As individuals and collectives respond to tensions and seek to create resolutions, ‘The practical solutions that represent the unexpected, the unrecognizable, are actually initial forms of new theories.’ Tension is necessary to create the new, and the breakdown of one activity system prompts the creation of a new activity system, more suited to its economic and social contexts. Hence, social progress is facilitated by tension, and expansive learning arises when existing activity systems are no longer fit for purpose.

References,
Eliot, T. S. (1922) The Sacred Wood: essays on poetry and criticism, Bartelby.com, http://www.bartleby.com/200/ (accessed 28 April 2011).

Engeström, Y. (1987) Learning by expanding: an activity-theoretical approach to developmental research. Helsinki, Orienta-Konsultit Oy. http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/toc.htm (accessed 28 April 2011).

Wenger, Etienne (1998, repr. 2005), Communities of Practice, Cambridge , Cambridge University Press.

Miettinen, ‘The Sources of Novelty…’ (2006)

Miettenen (2006) repeats Csikszentmihali’s argument that creativity cannot occur in a vacuum, an argument which challenges the concept of original creation: ‘Edison’s and Einstein’s discoveries would be inconceivable without the prior knowledge, without the intellectual and social network that stimulated their thinking, and without the social mechanisms that recognized and spread their innovations’ (p. 174). Wenger (1998, p. 141) makes the same argument: ‘Our knowing – even of the most unexceptional kind – is always too big, too rich, too ancient, and too connected for us to be the source of it individually.’ T.S. Eliot said essentially the same of artistic creativity in Tradition and the Individual Talent (1919). Innovation finds a form in its historical context.

Miettenen also repeats the idea that failures prompt learning. Knowledge can be transferred from one generation to another, but when contexts change the old knowledge no longer works, and hence reflection can lead to the production of new knowledge appropriate for a new context (an argument carrying echoes of the saber-tooth curriculum). Hence, knowledge is not static but is in a constant state of renewal.

In common with Engestrom, it’s hard to avoid the presence of Marxist thought in Miettenen’s analysis. He cites the ongoing tension between use value (functionality) and exchange value (price). Is it his contention that this tension is likely to precipitate a failure, resulting in reflection and, thereafter, a new form of economic organisation? This could well be a good idea (given that the capitalist economic model profits from scarce resources rather than protecting them), but the durability of the market economic model doesn’t seem to be considered in the article.

Miettenen acknowledges ‘the impossibility of predicting the various historical developments that may turn out to be significant for the emergence of an innovation’ (p. 179). What seems to emerge here is that new creations come from trial and error, with the parameters for any new creation being shaped by the historical moment. Miettenen, therefore, seems to be steering towards Foucault’s notion of epistemes, that each historical period has knowledge parameters determining the limits of the achievements of the era.

Engestrom’s theory of expansive learning may help us to recognise knowledge limits (if only in localised contexts), and maybe even challenge them. The Marxist thread comes from the recognition of dualistic tension as a structural feature of societies. Learning and teaching can be on either side of the dualism, either reaffirming existing knowledge and understanding, or attempting to catalyse new forms of knowledge.

References
Miettinen, R. (2006) ‘The Sources of Novelty: A Cultural and Systemic View of Distributed Creativity’ Creativity and Innovation Management, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 173-181

Wenger, Etienne (1998, repr. 2005), Communities of Practice, Cambridge , Cambridge University Press.

Engestrom – Enriching the Theory of Expansive Learning… (2007)

Engestrom (2007) posits a form of learning without the presence of an expert, the kind of learning where the answer is not already known (he uses the term ‘knotworking’). Some of the key characteristics of this form of learning are that it is horizontal (without a predetermined hierarchy of authority and influence) and interested in ‘boundary crossing’ (p. 24); learning need not reaffirm something already known but, instead, learning results in the creation of new knowledge.

Another feature of Engestrom’s approach is that tools (a term broadly defined, and incorporating technology) do not need an instruction manual but, instead, usage should be discovered by the user. He employs the hammer as an example: ‘A hammer is typically used as a recognition device: It helps you to recognize what may be hammered, such as nails. But a hammer may also serve as a symbol of workers’ power…. In other words, the material form and shape of the artifact have only limited power to determine its epistemic use’ (pp. 34-35). This leads Engestrom to conclude, ‘In expansive learning… reconfiguration of given technologies by their users is essential’ (p. 35). Learners start with a problem or a common purpose, they have tools made available to them, and then they strive for and (ideally) arrive at a workable solution, using technologies in ways they may not have been used before.

The central distinction between expansive learning and the communities of practice theory is that there is no centre of authority in the former. However, both approaches agree that learning is tied-in with identity. Engestrom quotes Gee (2003) who argues that entrants to a learning community need ‘to see themselves as the kind of a person who can learn, use, and value the new semiotic domain’ (p. 36). However, Engestrom (following the work of Turkel [1995]) recognises that virtual identities are not stable; they can be adopted and discarded at will. That said, is this not at least partially true of identity per se? It is problematic to assume that identity is fixed and stable, not least because most people maintain different personae in different contexts. T.S. Eliot was onto this a long time ago: ‘prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet.’

Regarding learning in the digital age, learners have a plethora of tools at their disposal. The tools come to mean whatever the learners do with them. If learners are given a goal or a dilemma, their use of the tools is axiomatically going to be less amorphous than it otherwise would be because an end is in mind, not configured as a result known a priori, but like a contest in play in which the outcome is shaped by the resourcefulness of the players within the frame of their activity. If they commit to the identity of a person or collective who can undertake the task, they are more likely to use the tools as they perceive that new identity would use them, and are therefore more likely to achieve the outcome they desire.

References
Engestrom, Y. (2007) ‘Enriching the Theory of Expansive Learning: Lessons From Journeys Toward Coconfiguration,’ Mind, Culture and Activity, vol. 14, nos. 1-2, pp. 23-39.

Gee, J. P. (2003) What video games have to teach us about learning and literacy, New York: Palgrave Macmilan.

Turkle, S. (1995) Life on the Screen, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.